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Introduction 
2020 provided the American oil and gas industry with a myriad of 
unprecedented problems. The novel coronavirus, COVID-19, sits 
predominately at the root of these unprecedented problems. Originating in 
Wuhan, China, as early as December 2019, COVID-19 has quickly swept 
across the globe, immensely impacting public health, travel, and global 
industry. Foreign and domestic industry alike incurred substantial economic 
blowback with lasting consequence. Among the industries most impacted 
by the global pandemic is the oil and gas industry. Global travel 
restrictions, international price disputes, and looming storage concerns have 
effectively thwarted the industry, causing panic and confusion among 
industry officials.  
This comment will analyze the implications of exercising force majeure 
provisions in oil and gas contracts. Specifically, this comment will analyze 
whether COVID-19 fits within the ambit of an affirmative defense to 
contractual non-performance.  
Part one will outline the basic structure of an oil and gas lease. Part two 
will define the concept of force majeure and its applicability within an oil 
and gas lease. Additionally, part two will discuss situations in which force 
majeure is invoked both generally and in relation to oil and gas leases. Part 
three introduces COVID-19’s impact on the oil and gas industry from both 
a foreign and domestic perspective. Part four will discuss whether COVID-
19 can serve as an affirmative defense to contractual performance. Part four 
will also introduce alternative defense to non-performance and whether 
COVID-19 justifies contractual relief within each defense. Finally, part five 
will discuss whether contracting parties should account for COVID-19 
when negotiating contracts in the future.  
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The Structure of an Oil and Gas Lease 
An oil and gas lease generally consists of a habendum clause, a granting 
clause, and various savings clauses. Oil and gas leases are fundamentally 
structured on a two-term basis. Habendum clauses are standard staples in 
any ordinary oil and gas lease used to define a primary term to the lessee 
for the development of the property.
1
 The primary term of an oil and gas 
lease is fixed, while a secondary term is imposed variably—most notably 
structured to continue so long thereafter as oil or gas is produced.
2
 
Production is requisite to maintain any lease. Failure to produce terminates 
the lease.
3
 To determine whether production, or lack thereof, withstands 
termination depends largely on jurisdiction.
4
 The majority approach, 
followed by states including Texas, interprets production to mean actual 
production. Alternatively, the minority approach, followed by Oklahoma, 
uses a capable of production theory, where a demonstrated capability to 
produce survives termination under the habendum clause.
5
 
Lease termination automatically occurs where production is wholly 
absent in the primary term.
6
 If production occurs within the primary term 
but ceases before its expiration, such cessation usually does not result in 
lease termination.
7
 However, if cessation occurs in the secondary term, 
lease cancellation is likely, absent a savings clause to the contrary.
8
 
When certain actions amount to cancellation under contractual terms, we 
look to savings clauses. Savings clauses in an oil and gas lease exist to 
circumvent lease cancellation for failure to satisfy agreed-upon terms 
within the habendum clause. Common savings clauses include continuous 




Cessation of production is both a doctrinal and clause-bound concept.
10
 
To avoid lease termination, the cessation must be temporary.
11
 Temporary 
cessation arises where production completely ceases or ceases to produce in 
                                                                                                             
 1. Wiser v. Enervest Operating, LLC, 803 F. Supp.2d 109, 118 (N.D.N.Y. 2011).  
 2. Id.  
 3. Id.  
 4. Id.  
 5. Id.  
 6. 2 KUNTZ, LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 26.8 (2021). 
 7. Id.  
 8. Id.  
 9. Id.  
 10. Id.  
 11. Id.  
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 The classification of temporary cessation requires 
courts to look at three factors: (1) the cause of cessation, (2) the time 
required to reasonably restore production, and (3) the diligence exercised 
by the lessee in restoring production.
13
Additionally, courts consider 
voluntariness.
14
 If the cessation is voluntary, the cessation is likely 
classified as permanent and subject to forfeiture, despite satisfying other 
factors that may indicate temporary cessation.
15
 Economic considerations 
are among the most frequently cited reasons for cessation.
16
 Oil price 
fluctuations may justify cessation under appropriate circumstances.
17
 
However, that determination may differ in capable-of-production states. 
Oklahoma courts generally hold that where the capability of production 
exists, a voluntary cessation may not terminate a lease.
18
 Similarly, 
Oklahoma courts have also upheld non-termination where production 
ceased to provide paying quantities.
19
 To solidify this rationale, the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court in Pack v. Santa Fe Minerals signified that “[a] 
lease continues in existence so long as the interruption of production in 
paying quantities does not extend for a period longer than reasonable or 
justifiable in light of the circumstances involved.”
20
 Further, the court 
maintains that “under no circumstances will cessation of production in 




Force Majeure Generally 
Force majeure is defined as non-performance by a party due to an 
impediment beyond party control.
22
 Usually, such an impediment must bear 
no reasonable expectation of occurrence or avoidance.
23
 When a qualifying 
circumstance manifests, parties are relieved of all or part of the 
                                                                                                             
 12. Id.  
 13. Id.  
 14. Id.  
 15. Id.  
 16. Id.  
 17. Id.  
 18. Id. See also Cotner v. Warren, 1958 OK 208, 330 P.2d 217; Pack v. Santa Fe 
Minerals, 1994 OK 23, 869 P.2d 323; Geyer Brothers Equip. Co., v. Standard Resources, 
L.L.C., 2006 OK CIV APP 92, 140 P.3d 563.  
 19. Stewart v. Amerada Hess Corp., 1979 OK 145, 604 P.2d 854.  
 20. 1994 OK 23, ¶ 10..  
 21. Id.  
 22. 14 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 77.1 (2020). 
 23. Id.  
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performance of the outlined contract.
24
 Though force majeure is rooted in 
common law, the events that bring about its application are rarely defined. 
Instead, what constitutes a qualifying circumstance largely relies on the 
express events set out in each contract and whether those circumstances are 
foreseeable to both parties at the execution of the contract.
25
  
Notice is a fundamental component to relieving non-performance. If a 
party fails to give notice of an event detrimental to performance, then it 




Force majeure presents itself uniquely in oil and gas leases as compared 
to any other ordinary contract. Given the unique nature of an oil and gas 
lease, force majeure subsequently provides a specific function not 
recognized in an ordinary contract.
27
 Oil and gas leases provide that 
consideration is dependent upon the payment of royalties.
28
 Payment of 
royalties requires due diligence on behalf of the lessee.
29
 The issue of 
nonperformance in an oil and gas lease leads to a greater likelihood of 
courts finding for the termination of the subsequent lease.
30
 This is due to 
the potential for irreparable harm suffered by the lessor if such performance 
doesn’t provide said lessor with the benefit of leasing his land.
31
  
Eugene Kuntz, renowned oil and gas law expert, defines three questions 
with respect to a supposed force majeure event.
32
 The first question is 
whether the obligation or performance in question is covered by the force 
majeure clause.
33
 The second question is whether the event that prevented 
performance is described in the clause.
34
 Finally, the third question is 
whether the event in question effectively prevented performance by the 
lessee.
35
 The first question is straightforward, as specific obligations that 
are excused “necessarily excludes others”.
36
 As to the second question, 
                                                                                                             
 24. Id.  
 25. Id. 
 26. Sabine Corp. v. ONG Western, Inc., 725 F. Supp. 1157 (W.D. Okla. 1989). 
 27. Joan Teshima, Annotation, Gas and oil lease force majeure provisions: construction 
and effect, 46 A.L.R.4th 976, § 2[a] (1986).  
 28. Id. 
 29. Id.  
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Kuntz, supra note 6, at § 53.5. 
 33. Id.  
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id.  
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Kuntz suggests that the specific event must be noted within the clause to 
apply.
37
 If the clause merely states excusal of performance due to a 
circumstance “beyond the control of [the] lessee,” then unspecified events 
may qualify.
38
 The third question establishes in-part a but-for causation 
test.
39
 Essentially, the question reads, but-for the event, would performance 
have occurred? Further, the question requires the specific event to be the 
cause of the non-performance.
40
 Courts recognize that materiality is also an 
important consideration.
41
 To excuse performance, an actual, material 
hindrance must occur.
42
 Further, the performance must be prevented and 
not merely made more expensive or inconvenient by the force majeure.
43
 
Courts consider force majeure as a modifier to both the primary and 
secondary terms of a habendum clause within an oil and gas lease.
44
 A 
specific example of this consideration is seen in Beardslee v. Inflection 
Energy, LLC.
45
 Here, producers sought to employ force majeure to extend 
the primary term of their lease after the imposition of a hydraulic fracturing 
moratorium.
46
 The court found that the force majeure clause did not modify 
the primary term of the lease.
47
 Absent any express language to the 
contrary, the habendum clause in the lease does not incorporate the force 
majeure clause.
48
 As to the secondary term, the court held that the force 
majeure provision did provide modification.
49
 In this case, the force 
majeure clause contained express language surrounding delay or 
interruption in drilling or production.
50
 Because no production occurred in 
the primary term, any force majeure provision with language mentioning 




                                                                                                             
 37. Id. 
 38. Id.  
 39. Id.  
 40. Id.  
 41. Perlman v. Pioneer Ltd. P’Ship, 918 F.2d 1244 (5th Cir. 1990).  
 42. Id.  
 43. Kuntz, supra note 6, at § 53.5.  
 44. Beardslee v. Inflection Energy, LLC, 25 N.Y.3d 150, 158, 31 N.E.3d 80, 84 (N.Y. 
2015).  
 45. Id.  
 46. Id. at 152.  
 47. Id. at 157.  
 48. Id. at 158.  
 49. Id. 
 50. Id.  
 51. Id. at 155.  
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Force Majeure Events 
Common law refrains from delineating precise events that constitute 
force majeure. Instead, modern courts defer to the events expressly agreed 
upon in individual contracts.
52
 When individual events are described within 
the contracts, the common-law doctrine of force majeure should not 
supersede the express, bargained-for terms.
53
 The most common 
circumstances provoking force majeure contemplation are divisible into 
three categories: market failure, acts of the government, and acts of God.  
Market Failure 
One of the most common yet largely controversial events circumscribed 
in a contractual force majeure clause is non-performance due to market 
failure. Our economy notoriously follows the systemic principles of a free 
market.
54
 Free-market economies are dependent upon private ownership 
and production driven by competition.
55
 To meet the demand of individuals, 
private companies produce and maintain supply, adjusting as necessary. 
This system is not without flaws. When demand supersedes supply, or vice 
versa, the system falls out of equilibrium, and thus requires corrective 
measures.
56
 Such a shock can generate a market failure.
57
  
The oil and gas market is infamously volatile.
58
 Both price and supply 
change at drastic rates.
59
 These market shifts are especially impactful upon 
production-oriented states.
60
 Taking volatility into account, issues 
surrounding market failure occur enough to necessitate consideration in 
force majeure clauses.
61
 Oil and gas industry participants routinely include 
                                                                                                             
 52. Perlman, 918 F.2d at 1248.  
 53. Id.  
 54. Tara Kibler, Capitalism, Socialism, or Fascism? A Guide to Economic Systems and 
Ideologies, HEIN ONLINE (July 22, 2020), https://home.heinonline.org/blog/2020/07/ 
capitalism-socialism-or-fascism-a-guide-to-economic-systems-and-ideologies/.  
 55. Id.  
 56. Stanley Fischer, Supply Shocks, Wage Stickiness, and Accommodation, THE 
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH (May 1983), https://www.nber.org/papers/ 
w1119.pdf.  
 57. Oil Price Volatility: US Shale Has Reshaped the Oil Market, But Boom-Bust Cycles 
Are Probably Here to Stay, COLUMBIA GLOBAL ENERGY DIALOGUES (December 14, 2016), 
https://www.energypolicy.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/pictures/Volatility%20Workshop
%20Summary.pdf. 
 58. Id.  
 59. Id. 
 60. Id.  
 61. Id.  
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failure of market provisions within their leases to provide a remedy in the 
event of market failure.
62
 Courts tend to split on their interpretations of such 
events within contractual clauses. Courts generally recognize that 
incremental price increase alone does not suffice to exercise force 
majeure.
63
 Nonproduction in an economic downturn usually does not satisfy 
a declaration of force majeure either.
64
 The reasoning behind that involves 
the consideration of foreseeability.
65
 However, if a contract contains an 




Acts of the Government 
Another event routinely included within the ambit of force majeure 
clauses concerns implications on behalf of the government. When the 
government acts, by imposing certain restrictions, subsequent contractual 
performance may be impacted. One of the biggest limitations to declaring 
force majeure due to government action is whether the action existed at the 
time of contract execution.
67
 If the action existed prior to executing the 
contract, courts generally reject force majeure claims.
68
 Alternatively, if the 
action postdates the contract, courts have a greater inclination to uphold 
force majeure claims.
69
An additional limitation to a claim against 
government action is whether the non-performance due to government 
action was beyond party control.
70
  
Both foreign and domestic government action may invoke force majeure. 
An example of foreign government action necessitating exercise of a 
contractual force majeure provision is demonstrated in Kyocera Corp. v. 
Hemlock Semiconductor, LLC.
71
 Here, the invocation of force majeure on 
behalf of a seller in a take-or-pay solar contract spurred from allegations of 
a foreign government illegally subsidizing its domestic companies.
72
 
                                                                                                             
 62. Id.  
 63. Golsen v. ONG Western, Inc., 1988 OK 26, ¶ 13, 756 P.2d 1209, 1213.  
 64. TEC Olmos, LLC v. ConocoPhillips Co., 555 S.W.3d 176, 183 (Tex. App. 2018).  
 65. Id.  
 66. Kodiak 1981 Drilling P’Ship v. Delhi Gas Pipeline Corp., 736 S.W.2d 715 (Tex. 
App. 1987).  
 67. Teshima, supra note 27, at § 8.  
 68. Id. at § 8[a].  
 69. Id. at § 8[b]. 
 70. Id. at § 8[c].  
 71. Kyocera Corp. v. Hemlock Semiconductor, LLC, 313 Mich. App. 437, 886 N.W.2d 
445 (2015).  
 72. Id. at 442.  
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Additionally, the seller alleged that given the subsidies, the companies 
participated in large-scale dumping, effectively flooding the market.
73
 
Ultimately, the Michigan Court of Appeals determined that conduct causing 
a market downturn for a take-or-pay contract cannot suffice for relieving a 
party of contractual obligation.
74
 The court’s rationale rests upon both the 
nature of the contract and the bargaining power each party had with respect 
to contemplating governmental action.
75
 
Courts have held that government orders imposing a moratorium on 
hydraulic fracturing do not constitute a force majeure event.
76
 This holding 
was the result when a landowner brought action against oil and gas lessees 
after governor David Patterson imposed a directive effectuating a 
moratorium on fracking within the state of New York.
77
 The lessees 
contended that the fracking ban hindered the development of the mineral 
formation.
78
 Further, lessees alleged that fracking was the only viable 
method for obtaining the minerals within the formation.
79
 Conversely, 
landowners, the parties pursuing the action in court, maintained that 
traditional drilling methods existed, thereby contesting that the fracking ban 
cannot constitute a force majeure event.
80
 Ultimately, the court upheld the 
landowners’ position, finding that New York’s fracking moratorium, 
though it may be factually consistent with a force majeure event, did not 
extend the disputed leases.
81
 Additionally, the court indicated that if drilling 
specifications had been contracted for, the result could be different.
82
 The 
results have been consistent in other cases dealing with force majeure 
claims due to New York’s fracking ban. In Beardslee v. Inflection Energy, 
LLC, the New York Court of Appeals held that a force majeure claim based 





                                                                                                             
 73. Id.  
 74. Id. at 451.  
 75. Id. at 455.  
 76. Aukema v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, 904 F. Supp. 2d 199, 210 (N.D.N.Y. 
2012). 
 77. Id. at 203. 
 78. Id. at 209.  
 79. Id.  
 80. Id.  
 81. Id. at 210.  
 82. Id.  
 83. Beardslee, 25 N.Y.3d at 158.  
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“Acts of God” 
Congress, through legislation, routinely defines an act of God as “an 
unanticipated grave natural disaster or other natural phenomenon of an 
exceptional, inevitable, and irresistible character the effects of which could 
not have been prevented or avoided by the exercise of due care or 
foresight.”
84
 Courts typically assess extraordinary phenomena in three 
parts.
85
 The phenomenon must be (1) abnormal or unusual in occurrence, 
(2) a force strictly of nature with no human assistance or influence, and (3) 
of such severity that human prudence or precaution could not have avoided 
the damage thereby caused.
86
 An act of God signifies that an individual is 
not liable “for injuries or damages caused by an act that falls within the 
meaning of the term ‘act of God.’”
87
 However, this claim of relief is not 
automatic.
88
 Instead, the “proponent bears the burden of proof.”
89
 Further, 
the established defense then becomes a question of fact, left in the hands of 
the fact finder.
90
 It is pivotal to recognize that acts of God, unlike an 
inevitable accident, lack a component of human agency.
91
 On this 
contention, some courts only consider acts of God absent fault of man, as 
the presence of one “excludes the other.”
92
  
Courts generally recognize that natural disasters and extreme weather 
conditions can constitute an act of God.
93
 This presupposition requires that 
the act was unforeseeable and unanticipated.
94
 If the act is foreseeable, there 
is a requirement to exercise due care towards prevention efforts.
95
 
Causation is also an important consideration when determining acts of God. 
Courts generally maintain that human interference or influence must be 
absent, even if the event is otherwise considered an act of God.
96
 This was 
the holding in American National Red Cross v. Vinton Roofing Co., where a 
roofer’s waterproofing measures added a human interference component to 
                                                                                                             
 84. 33 U.S.C.A § 2701(1) (2018). See also, 42 U.S.C.A § 9601(1).  
 85. 6 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D 319 § 1 (1989). 
 86. Id.  
 87. 1 AM. JUR. 2D ACT OF GOD § 3 (2021).  
 88. Id.  
 89. Id.  
 90. Id.  
 91. 1 AM. JUR. 2D ACT OF GOD § 2 (2021).  
 92. Cox v. Vernieuw, 604 P.2d 1353, 1356 (Wyo. 1980).  
 93. Michael Faure et al., Industrial Accidents, Natural Disasters and “Acts of God”, 43 
GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 383, 392 (2015).  
 94. Id.  
 95. Id. at 404.  
 96. Am. Nat. Red Cross v. Vinton Roofing Co., 629 F. Supp. 2d 5, 9 (D.D.C 2009).  
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol7/iss1/7
2021]      Reevaluating Force Majeure Within Oil & Gas Contracts 159 
 
 
an otherwise force-majeure-protected rainstorm.
97
 Ultimately, the court 
barred recovery due to human agency, despite the rainstorm factually 
representing a force majeure event.
98
  
In addition to events like natural disasters, illness or death may also 
constitute an act of God.
99
 Like natural disasters and weather-related events, 
asserting illness as an act of God defense requires a showing the event was 
both unforeseeable and unavoidable.
100
 Illness as an act of God defense, 
however, is rarely invoked. And finally, courts refrain from classifying 




Introduction of COVID-19 & Force Majeure 
COVID-19’s Impact on Domestic Oil and Gas Industry 
On April 20, 2020, the price of oil went negative for the first time in 
history.
102
 This unprecedented drop marked the price of a barrel of West 
Texas Intermediate at minus $37.63, the lowest recorded price ever.
103
 This 
drastic drop was a product of storage concerns.
104
 Given state-imposed 
lockdowns and global travel restrictions at the time, oil demand virtually 
collapsed.
105
 Decreased demand in conjunction with increased output 
created a substantial supply shock.
106
  
Following the crash of crude oil prices, domestic producers began to call 
on state legislative action for relief.
107
 Oklahoma was the first state to 
respond to the requested relief.
108
 On April 22, 2020, the Oklahoma 
Corporation Commission issued an emergency order effectuating 
                                                                                                             
 97. Id. at 10. 
 98. Id.  
 99. 1 AM. JUR. 2D ACT OF GOD § 6 (2021).  
 100. Id.  
 101. Teshima, supra note 27 at §9[b].  
 102. Andrew Walker, US oil prices turn negative as demand dries up, BBC NEWS (Apr. 
21, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-52350082.  
 103. Id.  
 104. Id.  
 105. Id.  
 106. Id.  
 107. Liz Hampton, Reeling Oklahoma oil producers win right to keep leases while wells 
shut, REUTERS (Apr. 22, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-oil-usa-oklahoma-
cuts/reeling-oklahoma-oil-producers-win-right-to-keep-leases-while-wells-shut-
idUSKCN2242DR.  
 108. Id.  
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permissible cessation of production.
109
 The decision allowed Oklahoma oil 
companies to consider unprofitable production as economic waste, which 
may shield producers from losing their leases that would otherwise be 
cancelled.
110
 The New Mexico State Land Office followed in Oklahoma’s 
footsteps by passing similar emergency measures.
111
 
COVID-19’s impact also extended to domestic drilling. At the end of 
2020, domestic output of crude oil fell well below pre-pandemic levels at 
roughly 2.1 million barrels per day.
112
 The domestic output drop reflects 
cost cuts made by producers in light of COVID-19.
113
 COVID-19’s impact 
resulted in numerous companies declaring bankruptcy, employee layoffs, 
and ultimately a resurgence of OPEC as the top global market player.
114
 
COVID-19’s Impact on Foreign Oil and Gas Industry 
COVID-19’s impact caused great, international concern in the oil and 
gas industry. Much of the international impact stemmed from China. In 
February 2020, the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade 
commenced the issuance of force majeure certificates.
115
 In March 2020, 
PetroChina, China’s leading gas supplier, declared force majeure to 
suspend natural gas imports.
116
 The decision to suspend imports ultimately 
resulted in the delay of multiple cargoes due to their inability to operate 
some of their liquefied natural gas terminals at full capacity.
117
Additionally, 
in February 2020, China National Offshore Oil Corp (“CNOOC”) declared 
                                                                                                             
 109. Id.  
 110. Id.  
 111. Id.  
 112. David Wethe, Oil Drilling in U.S. Ends Fraught 2020 at Pre-Shale Levels, 
BLOOMBERG LAW (Dec. 30, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-12-
30/oil-drilling-in-u-s-ends-a-fraught-2020-at-pre-shale-era-levels.  
 113. Id.  
 114. Id.  
 115. CCPIT Provides COVID-19 Force Majeure Certificates and Other Services, CHINA 
COUNCIL FOR THE PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE (Mar. 13, 2020), https://en.ccpit. 
org/infoById/40288117668b3d9b0170d2952a7f0799/2. 
 116. Chen Aizhu & Jessica Jaganathan, PetroChina suspends some gas contracts as 
coronavirus hits demand, REUTERS (Mar. 5, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
petrochina-gas-exclusive/petrochina-suspends-some-gas-contracts-as-coronavirus-hits-
demand-sources-idUSKBN20S10W.  
 117. Stephen Stapczynski, CNOOC refuses LNG cargoes, declaring force majeure over 
coronavirus, WORLD OIL (Feb. 6, 2020), https://www.worldoil.com/news/2020/2/6/cnooc-
refuses-lng-cargoes-declaring-force-majeure-over-coronavirus.  
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force majeure on liquefied natural gas deliveries from three suppliers.
118
 
CNOOC’s declaration carried great weight because CNOOC operates 
roughly half of China’s liquefied natural gas terminals.
119
 On the receiving 
end of CNOOC’s force majeure declaration, two of Europe’s largest energy 
companies, Shell and Total, rejected CNOOC’s pleas.
120
 Both Shell and 
Total’s justifications for rejection came from concern over the possibility of 
Chinese firms exiting long-term contracts.
121
 
A similar situation occurred in India. In March 2020, Indian liquefied 
natural gas importers issued force majeure notices to suppliers.
122
 LNG 
firms cited a lack of domestic gas demand and lack of port operations due 
to the spread of the COVID-19 as reasons for issuing notices.
123
 Gujarat 
State Petroleum Corp (“GSPC”), one of India’s largest oil firms, issued 
force majeure notices to its liquefied natural gas suppliers due to 
overwhelmingly full storage tanks and depleted domestic demand.
124
  
On the domestic front, in April 2020, Continental Resources declared 
force majeure on at least one of its contracts to a fuel producer.
125
 This 
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declaration came a day after the negative oil price plunge. Continental cited 
the pandemic as its reason for its subsequent declaration and that they 
“couldn’t have foreseen the dramatic rout caused by the coronavirus 
outbreak” and that “selling oil at negative prices constitutes waste.”
126
 
Continental Resources is the largest oil and gas producer in North 
Dakota.
127
 As a result of the ongoing pandemic, however, Continental 
Resources suspended all drilling in North Dakota, shut-in wells, and 
ultimately issued force majeure notice.
128
 
Introduction to Issue: Can COVID-19 Trigger Force Majeure 
in an Oil and Gas Contract? 
Whether COVID-19 serves to excuse an oil and gas lease depends on 
answering Kuntz’s three questions: (1) whether the obligation or 
performance is covered by an applicable force majeure clause, (2) whether 
COVID-19, or pandemic related language is described within the force 




Is the Performance or Obligation Covered? 
Determining performance within a lease is straightforward. Essentially, 
Kuntz’s first question boils down to two elements: (1) whether a force 
majeure provision exists; and (2) whether the contract describes the 
performance or obligation at issue.
130
 Given force majeure provisions 
typically exist within oil and gas contracts, the first element is likely 
satisfied.
131
 Absent a force majeure provision, parties may retain alternate 
relief. The following section discusses such relief at length. Upon 
determining the first element, the second element is simple. If the 
performance in question is bargained-for and precisely outlined within the 
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four corners of the contract, asserting force majeure is possible, therefore 
prompting discussion of the second question.  
Are Pandemic Related Terms Within the Force Majeure Provision? 
Pandemics, epidemics, and other related global events sometimes surface 
within contracts. Whether COVID-19 is a force majeure event largely 
depends on bargained-for terms within an individual contract.
132
 When 
contracts expressly contain pandemic considerations, the court’s 
interpretation is simple, but this is rarely the case.
133
 Instead, it may be 
permissible to measure COVID-19’s impact on typical force majeure events 
or a catchall provision, if applicable. To determine whether COVID-19 
modifies standard force majeure events requires this section to analyze 
COVID-19’s relevance to (1) market failure, (2) government action, and (3) 
acts of God.  
COVID-19 & Market Failure 
Undoubtedly, COVID-19 substantially impacts global markets. Among 
the most impacted is the global market for oil and gas. Drastic reductions in 
the international energy demand coupled with a flood of storage concerns 
fueled a frenzied producer panic.  
Asserting force majeure in contemplation of market failure will likely 
face difficulty in court. Though it is undisputed that a global pandemic 
weighs substantially on domestic and foreign markets, such weight isn’t 
given much deference in court. Absent express enumeration of an economic 
downturn as a force majeure event, courts are unlikely to find for excusal of 
performance. This is especially true where the applicable force majeure 
clause enumerates multiple force majeure events.
134
 Additionally, courts 
will not presume changes in economic conditions as a force majeure event 
where it is not enumerated.
135
  
Whether COVID-19’s market impact furnishes parties with a solid basis 
to mitigate performance depends largely on whether their contract 
contemplated an economic downturn as a force majeure event. If the 
contract contains language indicating an economic downturn as a 
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consideration in the invocation of force majeure, then the likelihood of 
potential contractual relief increases. Additionally, the enumeration of 
market considerations generally spares parties from having to prove 
foreseeability. This holding is reflected in Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. 
McDonnell Douglas Corp, where the court stated, “when the promisor has 
anticipated a particular event by specifically providing for it in a contract, 
he should be relieved of liability for the occurrence of such event regardless 
of whether it was foreseeable.”
136
 Absent such an enumeration, the 
likelihood of success based on economic considerations is low. However, 
that does not mean that it is not possible.  
COVID-19 & Government Action 
Is government action relating to COVID-19 sufficient to invoke force 
majeure claims? Again, that depends on several factors. A government 
order, construed as a “stay-at-home order,” likely classifies as an act of the 
government subject to force majeure consideration. Beginning in March 
2020, government officials commenced statewide shutdowns. In Oklahoma, 
Governor Kevin Stitt issued an executive order effectively closing non-
essential businesses for an indefinite period throughout all seventy-seven 
state counties.
137
 Within this directive, Governor Stitt collated essential 
businesses to remain open during the shutdown period.
138
 Various sectors 
like chemical, commercial and professional services, construction and 
infrastructure, energy, healthcare and social assistance, are among 
“essential industries” precluded from a shutdown.
139
  
Under Governor Stitt’s executive order, energy is an essential industry in 
Oklahoma.
140
 Within the sector, functions like mining, oil and gas 
extraction, pipeline transportation, electrical equipment manufacturing, and 
machinery manufacturing are deemed essential, thereby retaining the ability 
to remain open during a shutdown period.
141
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A similar result ensued in Texas. In March 2020, Texas Governor Greg 
Abbott issued an executive order closing non-essential businesses.
142
 Under 
the executive order, Sectors like essential retail, healthcare, energy, and 
transportation were essential, thereby allowing operational functionality 
with heightened safety restrictions.
143
  
Like Governor Stitt’s Executive Order, Governor Abbott’s executive 
order classified energy as an essential sector.
144
 Within the energy sector, 
workers involved in electricity, petroleum, natural gas, and water and 
wastewater generally retained work during the shutdown.
145
 Under the 
executive order, oil and gas exploration and production activities, like 
drilling, extraction, production, refining, and transportation were essential 
and were allowed to remain in operation.
146
 
Thus, whether a government directive addressing COVID-19 classifies 
as a force majeure event depends on the industry in question. In re Hitz 
Restaurant Group demonstrates how non-essential businesses have a 
demonstrated likelihood to invoke success force majeure.
147
 This is due to 
the restriction on in-person gatherings mandated by state executive 
orders.
148
 In Illinois, non-essential business owners, due to the state-
imposed restrictions, shut down businesses and subsequently sought relief 
due to the inability to pay rent to respective landlords.
149
 The court 
ultimately granted a partial excusal of contractual performance.
150
 This is 
because the restaurant industry, through executive order, was not 
completely shut-down, but rather drastically limited to take-out and off-
premises consumption.
151
 In sum, the survivable force majeure claim 
consisted of a valuation of space usable in light of state-imposed 
restrictions.
152
 The court determined that the restaurant owner was not liable 
for rent payment reflecting the square footage of the restaurant implicated 
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by the shut-down order.
153
 Instead, the business owner was liable for 
twenty-five percent of their rent, as that percentage signified the useable 
space within their restaurant.
154
 The remaining majority percentage 
reflected dine-in space, subject to shut-down limitations.
155
 
Therefore, contracts in non-essential industries likely face more success 
when asserting force majeure. Because essential industry, like oil and gas, 
is shielded from shutdown risk, unlike non-essential industry, they are less 
likely to succeed. 
COVID-19 & Acts of God 
Is COVID-19 an act of God? Some public officials seem to think so. 
Oklahoma Governor Kevin Stitt thought so, and on his belief, sent a letter 
to President Donald Trump requesting that he declare the pandemic an act 
of God.
156
 Stitt sent the prayer for relief after the sharp decline in oil and 
gas prices.
157
 Stitt claimed that such a determination is for the “narrow 
purpose of protecting the[] producers from actions to cancel leases held by 
production as a result of production stoppage.”
158
 No subsequent 
declaration from President Trump followed from this prayer.
159
 
The incorporation of COVID-19 as an act of God recently began to 
surface among some state courts. In New York, courts have defined 
COVID-19 as a natural disaster like an act of God.
160
 Here, courts 
contemplated COVID-19 as a natural disaster under a force majeure 
insurance provision.
161
 In reaching their conclusion, the court turned to 
dictionary definitions of natural disasters.
162
 The court, in accordance with 
Black’s Law Dictionary, defined “natural” as “brought by nature as 
opposed to artificial means,” and “disaster” as [a] calamity; a catastrophic 
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 On this reasoning, the court determined that “by any 




If the applicable force majeure clause refrains from mentioning 
pandemic-related terms, does a broad, catchall provision exist? Catchall 
provisions provide relief without enumeration of specific events that qualify 
for invocation of force majeure. Catchall provisions are usually 
encapsulated in a phrase such as the following: “any other clause beyond 
control of the respective party.”
165
 Though catchall provisions serve to 
encompass more circumstances for exercising force majeure, courts remain 
hesitant to interpret them liberally.
166
 Instead, courts look to events 
reasonably related by nature or within similar circumstances to the listed 
force majeure events within the contract when deciding whether an event 
not circumscribed renders excuse of contractual performance.
167
 
Black’s Law Dictionary defines foreseeability as “[t]he quality of being 
reasonably anticipatable.”
168
 Foreseeability is a critical component to force 
majeure when a claimant is relying upon a catchall provision. Courts 
generally require a showing of unforeseeability to relieve contractual 
performance.
169
 Alternatively, when asserting force majeure under an event 
directly listed within the provision, courts are split in incorporating an 
element of foreseeability. Oklahoma courts generally read foreseeability as 
a loose requirement, meaning that where foreseeability isn’t required by 
contract, Oklahoma courts refrain from imposing a strict foreseeability 
element.
170




Whether a pandemic like COVID-19 is foreseeable is up for debate, as it 
has yet to be judicially determined. On one hand, many argue that 
pandemics serve as a classic example of a force majeure event.
172
 On the 
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other hand, some argue that given various outbreaks in history, like SARS, 
or the Avian Flu, a pandemic is relatively foreseeable in its occurrence, 
therefore failing to account for it within one’s contract amounts to 
waiver.
173
 Whether one’s approach is the former or latter, timing is still an 
important consideration. If a party contracted pre-pandemic, a claim of 
force majeure absent inclusion of pandemic-related language within a 
contract likely makes a better case for exercising force majeure, as opposed 
to parties contracting amidst the pandemic. 
Additional Considerations & Contract Choice 
While it is imperative to consider the lease language within the contract, 
other considerations worthy of examination manifest. Courts generally 
recognize that the application of force majeure is dependent upon the 
express terms outlined in individual agreements.
174
 Courts tend to refrain 
from acting as gatekeepers in this realm to avoid rewriting contracts or 
interpreting agreements beyond the parties’ intentions.
175
  
Choice of law is among one of the most relevant considerations when 
determining force majeure. State court interpretation varies with respect to 
defining certain force majeure events, notice requirements, and 
foreseeability requirements. Undoubtedly, state courts tend to interpret 
force majeure clauses differently based on their own established bodies of 
case law. However, most courts have an overarching tendency to interpret 
force majeure on a per-lease basis.
176
  
Type of contract is also a relevant consideration when determining 
whether to exercise force majeure. Base Contracts for the Sale and Purchase 
of Natural Gas, or NAESB Contracts, prepared by the North American 
Energy Standards Board, are among the most frequently used within the 
industry, given their standard uniformity.
177
 Standard NAESB contracts 
consist of three parts: (1) a base contract containing terms and conditions, 
(2) a transaction confirmation form, allowing parties to add details specific 
to their agreements, and (3) a special provision addendum, which allows for 
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modification of the standard terms and conditions.
178
 The distinction in the 
type of contract spurs from the idea that force majeure may be treated 
differently among various contracts. The following is an example of a force 
majeure provision in a standard NAESB contract: 
Force Majeure shall include but not be limited to the following: 
(i) physical events such as acts of God, landslides, lightning, 
earthquakes, fires, storms or storm warnings, such as 
hurricanes113, which result in evacuation of the affected area, 
floods, washouts, explosions, breakage or accident or necessity 
of repairs to machinery or equipment or lines of pipe114; (ii) 
weather related events affecting an entire geographic region, 
such as low temperatures which cause freezing115 or failure of 
wells or lines of pipe; (iii) interruption of firm transportation 
and/or storage by Transporters; (iv) acts of others such as strikes, 
lockouts or other industrial disturbances, riots, sabotage, 
insurrections or wars; and (v) governmental actions such as 
necessity for compliance with any court order, law, statute, 
ordinance, or regulation promulgated by a governmental 
authority having jurisdiction. Seller and Buyer shall make 
reasonable efforts to avoid the adverse impacts of a Force 
Majeure and to resolve the event or occurrence once it has 
occurred in order to resume performance.
179
 
Further, the force majeure provision within a standard NAESB contract 
includes notice as a subcomponent to exercising force majeure.
180
  
Texas courts interpreted the standard NAESB force majeure provision 
above in Virginia Power Energy Marketing, Inc. v. Apache Corp. Here, 
Apache invoked force majeure after hurricanes Katrina and Rita damaged 
the production pipeline and prevented their contractual performance.
181
 
Given significant damage to the pipeline associated with the contract, 
Apache notified Virginia Power of its inability to deliver gas.
182
 Upon 
receiving notice, Virginia Power requested Apache’s gas delivery at an 
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alternate location, but Apache declined.
183
 Virginia Power subsequently 
sought judicial action, alleging that Apache failed to use reasonable efforts 
to deliver under the contractual terms.
184
 Ultimately, the court found for 
partial excusal under the NAESB contract relying on its base terms.
185
  
At the outset, force majeure also commonly requires a control element.
186
 
To prevail, the event must be beyond the control of either party.
187
 When 
the asserting party possesses control over the event, a force majeure 
assertion is likely unsuccessful.
188
 NAESB force majeure clauses also 
require a lack of causal nexus.
189
 The standard NAESB contract signifies 
force majeure to not be “any cause not reasonably within the control of the 
party claiming suspension.”
190
 The narrow construction of force majeure 
provisions within NAESB contracts serves to provide a higher bar to 
recovery.  
Question One Conclusion 
The inclusion of pandemic-related terms within a lease serves to induce a 
simplistic avenue of relief. Though rare in the meantime, it may be 
increasingly common to include express terms incorporating such terms in 
future contract drafting. Absent explicit language or enumeration, it 
remains possible to incorporate COVID-19 under certain blanket force 
majeure events. Though COVID-19 undoubtedly impacts the market, a 
claim of force majeure under a market failure theory may not lead to 
contractual relief.  
COVID-19 and subsequent government action as a force majeure event 
may carry a greater likelihood of survivability. This contention, however, 
largely depends on the industry affected by the government action and 
subsequent restrictions imposed thereof. For an essential industry, like oil 
and gas, government action may not give rise to a successful invocation of a 
force majeure claim. This is because the oil and gas industry, unlike a non-
essential industry, does not face severe operational restrictions resulting 
from government directives, like stay-at-home orders. In fact, many 
industry-related operational facilities remained open during state-wide 
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shutdowns. However, a different outcome may ensue when raising a claim 
within an industry classified as non-essential.  
Asserting COVID-19 as an act of God may also give rise to a potentially 
successful claim. Though litigation surrounding this issue is sparse at this 
point, as we continue to live in the age of COVID-19, more issues 
surrounding this precise determination may follow. 
When explicit enumeration of pandemics-related language does not exist, 
and blanket force majeure events, like acts of the government, cannot 
provide a solid basis for reliving contractual performance, catchall 
provisions may remedy non-performance relating to COVID-19. This 
statement, however, relies upon the existence of an applicable catchall 
provision within the contract. Further, whether COVID-19 could fall under 
a catchall provision depends on if it’s reasonably related to other 
enumerated terms within the force majeure clause. Absent a showing of 
reasonable relation, COVID-19 may not serve to defend non-performance 
under a catchall provision, as courts refrain from liberal interpretation.  
Other considerations serve an equally important function in determining 
the applicability of force majeure. Choice of law and type of contract are 
also important considerations in deciding whether to invoke force majeure 
due to COVID-19. After considering these factors and determining whether 
COVID-19 serves as an applicable force majeure event, we can then ask the 
final question: whether COVID-19 effectively prevents performance. 
Did COVID-19 Effectively Prevent Performance? 
The third question in this analysis centers around whether COVID-19 
effectively prevented performance. There mere existence of a pandemic 
will not shield parties from non-performance.
191
 Instead, parties must prove 
an element of causation as to the event and their non-performance.
192
 
Simply put, parties must ask: but-for the pandemic, would contractual 
performance occur? This essentially develops into a but-for causation test.  
The existence of the pandemic, without more, will not likely excuse 
performance even if the agreement includes pandemic-related terms. To 
prevail, parties must show that the pandemic effectively prevented 
contractual performance. For example, if parties were unable to fulfill lease 
obligations due to a restrictive government action barring oil and gas 
operations in the wake of the pandemic, parties would then have a chance at 
asserting force majeure to relieve lease obligations. However, this 
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doomsday situation remains highly unlikely considering the classification 
of oil and gas as an essential industry.  
Alternative Relief 
Absent an applicable force majeure provision, parties may retain 
alternate avenues of relief. The suggested methods of relief rely both on 
common law and statute. The statute-based approach depends on the usage 
of the Uniform Commercial Code. The two common-law approaches are 
the Doctrine of Frustration and the Doctrine of Impracticability.  
UCC §2-615 
The Uniform Commercial Code provides a method of relief absent an 
express force majeure clause. The Code provides that a seller is excused 
“from timely delivery of goods contracted for, where his performance has 
become commercially impracticable because of unforeseen supervening 
circumstances not within the contemplation of the parties at the time of 
contracting.”
193
 In order for the UCC provisions to apply, the contract must 
adhere to the requisite standards, that is, the contract’s purpose being for the 
commercial sale of goods.
194
 Like contractual force majeure, statutory force 
majeure adheres to the same standards. Notice remains an important 
consideration when claiming relief.
195
 Similarly, an exercise of due 
diligence to mitigate the circumstance is also a thoughtful consideration 
when claiming relief from non-performance.
196
 Contractual relief cannot be 
granted to a party that fails to exercise due care.
197
It is important to note 




Like contractual force majeure, statutory force majeure is limited in its 
usage. The UCC dictates that changes in price or cost alone cannot 
substantiate the usage of statutory force majeure.
199
 Market failure is also 
considered within the UCC.
200
 Market failure, like price fluctuations, don’t 
warrant relief, as market shifting constitutes a “business risk which business 
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contracts made at fixed prices are intended to cover.”
201
 However, drastic 
and unprecedented circumstances may render a different outcome. The 
UCC contemplates circumstances of severe shortages of supply in the event 
of an unforeseen shutdown of major sources of supply.
202
 In the event of 
such a shutdown, the seller must be barred from procuring materials 
requisite to one’s performance.
203
 Further considerations as to weight of 
non-performance must be made. Where the failure to deliver only amounts 
to a small portion of the contract, the failure is not fully excused.
204
 Instead, 
the contracting party must fulfill their contractual obligations to the extent 
allowed by the supervening event.
205
 Oklahoma codified the UCC statutory 
force majeure provision in 1961.
206
 Subsequent case law provides similar 
results to contractual force majeure. Relating to oil and gas contracts, 
Oklahoma courts have held that statutory force majeure is inapplicable 
where a substantial deviation between contract prices and the market value 
of gas beyond control of the parties exists.
207
 Circumstances like increased 
government regulation on the market that render a contract more difficult to 
fulfill do not justify statutory-imposed relief, because government 
regulation, Oklahoma courts conclude, is foreseeable as a matter of law.
208
  
States like Texas consider the applicability of the UCC as a gap-filler in 
interpreting force majeure.
209
 However, the protection awarded by the usage 
of the UCC is limited.
210
 The protection afforded by the usage of the UCC 
must not be used to vary bargained-for contractual terms.
211
 
Whether UCC §2-615 is applicable depends again upon the contract in 
question and the party seeking to assert statutory force majeure. The 
language of §2-615 indicates applicability to parties represented as sellers 
rather than buyers. However, commentary within the statutory provision 
may indicate the extension of protection to buyers.
212
 As to subject-matter 
applicability, COVID-19 may serve as a defense to non-performance if the 
contract in question meets the requirements of applicable UCC standards. If 
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the contract surrounds the sale of commercial goods, the determination then 
becomes whether performance is commercially impracticable because of 
COVID-19. Further, showings of both notice and due diligence must be 
proven in accord with the code. Non-performance resulting from COVID-
19-related government action may face a higher bar to recovery. This is due 
to the notion that difficulty placed upon the market by government action is 
outlaid as foreseeable, and a mere increase in difficulty to perform does not 
excuse performance under the UCC. However, Market Contentions and 
COVID-19 under UCC §2-615 face similar difficulties in defending non-
performance under contractual force majeure. Ultimately, where a contract 
refrains from the inclusion of a force majeure provision, statutory force 
majeure under UCC may act as a vessel to mitigate performance or lack 
thereof.  
Doctrine of Impracticability 
The doctrine of impracticability refers to nonperformance without fault 
where such performance is impracticable.
213
 The Second Restatement of 
Contracts defines existing impracticability as: 
[w]here, at the time a contract is made, a party’s performance 
under it is impracticable without his fault because of a fact of 
which he has no reason to know and the non-existence of which 
is a basic assumption on which the contract is made, no duty to 
render that performance arises, unless the language or 
circumstances indicate the contrary.
214
 
Courts have interpreted this excerpt from the restatement to reflect three 
components requisite to determining existing impracticability.
215
 The first 
element asks whether there was fault.
216
 The second element asks whether 
the occurrence was foreseeable.
217
 Finally, the third element asks whether 
assumption of the risk is present, effectively barring recovery.
218
 Usually, 
the timing of the circumstance giving rise to impracticability is difficult to 
determine.
219
 To determine impracticability, the Restatement offers a two-
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 The first factor asks whether the affected party knew or 
had reason to know of the factors contributing to impracticability.
221
 To 
assert impracticability, the asserting party must lack formidable awareness 
of causal circumstances.
222
 The second factor asks whether the 
impracticability prevented duty from arising or whether an arisen duty 
should be worthy of discharge.
223
 The latter of the two distinctions awards 




Impracticability is usually measured in objective terms. Objective 
impracticability may relieve performance whereas subjective 
impracticability, without more, may not.
225
 Common-law impracticability 
in oil and gas contractual dealings usually operates together with 
commercial impracticability within the UCC. In Sunflower Elec. Co-Op v. 
Tomlinson Oil Co., parties sought excusal of performance under theories of 
impossibility and impracticability after failing to deliver gas agreed upon.
226
 
The court in Sunflower contemplated the interrelatedness of the 
Restatement’s definition of the doctrine of impracticability and commercial 
impracticability within the UCC.
227
 Ultimately, the court determined that 
impracticability in this case was merely subjective, therefore diminishing 
excusal of contractual performance.
228
  
Whether COVID-19 serves to excuse contract performance on the 
grounds of impracticability depends not only on the foreseeability of the 
circumstances involved but also the objectivity of impracticability as 
determined by the court. If performance is hindered by COVID-19, the 
party seeking relief under impracticability must determine: (1) whether 
their performance, or lack thereof, is attributable to their fault, (2) whether 
the occurrence of COVID-19 and its impact on performance was 
foreseeable, and (3) whether an assumption of risk was included within the 
contract. If a party’s performance failed to occur through no fault of their 
own, COVID-19’s impact on the performance was unforeseeable, and no 
assumption of any risk associated with the performance was apparent from 
                                                                                                             
 220. Id.  
 221. Id. at Comment a.  
 222. Id.  
 223. Id.  
 224. Id.  
 225. Sunflower Electric, 638 P.2d at 970.  
 226. Id. at 965.  
 227. Id. at 969.  
 228. Id. at 964.  
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2021
176 Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal [Vol. 7 
  
 
the agreement, then a potential defense may give rise to relieving 
contractual non-performance. 
Frustration of Purpose 
Frustration of purpose is also a potential avenue of relief. Frustration of 
Purpose is a common-law doctrine predicated on contractual 
performance.
229
 Parties enter into contracts for an objective purpose.
230
 
While both parties may enter into such agreements for separate reasons, 
parties generally have a “common object” between them.
231
 Unlike the 
doctrine of impracticability or impossibility, the doctrine of frustration 
doesn’t wholly depend on either the impossibility or difficulty in 
performance.
232
 Simply put, the doctrine of frustration applies where parties 
lack any reason for the continuance of the contract.
233
 Though the doctrines 
of impossibility, impracticability, and frustration are fundamentally 
different, supervening events, like an act of God or market failure, similarly 
give rise to claims of all three. Frustration of purpose favors buyers and 
lessees, while impossibility or impracticability favors lessors and sellers.
234
 
Courts tend to interpret this doctrine differently. Some courts grant relief if 
frustration occurs out of a “common object” to the contracting parties 
jointly, while others grant relief on a more one-sided basis.
235
 
To evaluate frustration, The Second Restatement of Contracts sets out 
three requirements.
236
 The first requirement is that the frustrated purpose 
must be a principal purpose of one of the parties contracting.
237
 That 
principal purpose must be fundamental to the party contracting.
238
 The 
second requirement is that the frustration must be severe.
239
 The severity of 
the frustration must go beyond any assumable risk.
240
 The final requirement 
is that the parties could not have considered the frustration’s occurrence.
241
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Instead, parties must have assumed the opposite.
242
 Considering 
foreseeability, the Restatement signifies that a frustrating event does not 
necessarily need to be unforeseeable, though court interpretation and 
resulting case law may dictate otherwise.
243
  
Frustration of purpose sometimes manifests in oil and gas contracts. 
Events that have caused parties to invoke the doctrine of frustration include 
state-imposed moratoria on hydraulic fracturing.
244
 Here, parties sought 
relief due to a lack of productivity caused by the imposed restrictions on 
drilling within the state of New York.
245
 In this case, the producers 
attempted to use the doctrine of frustration to extend the subsequent leases 
beyond their primary terms.
246
 The producers contended that hydraulic 
fracturing was the only viable method to obtain oil and gas from the leased 
lands, and the usage of traditional methods would be irresponsible and 
unprofitable.
247
 Ultimately, the court found that the lease failed to specify 
specific unconventional drilling methods and that the state directive was 
foreseeable, the producers were not entitled to relief.
248
 
Whether COVID-19 frustrates contractual performance depends in part 
on jurisdiction and factual matters within individual cases. To determine 
applicability, answering the three requirements of the Restatement as they 
relate to COVID-19 may shed light on the survivability of a frustration 
claim. To survive the first requirement, a party must assert that a contested 
purpose is of principle. For purposes of analysis, envision two parties 
contracting for the sale and delivery of oil or gas. Hypothetically, if a 
drastic reduction in global transportation coupled with an insurmountable 
decline in oil demand manifested during the execution of a contract, then 
the purpose of sale and delivery likely faces a contractual challenge. 
Consider port closure, for example. If ports indefinitely closed due to the 
ongoing pandemic, the purpose of a hypothetical delivery of oil or gas 
would likely be frustrated. The delivery serves as principal purpose of the 
contract, and the inability to deliver and receive the goods likely frustrates 
both contracting parties. The second element requires severity of 
frustration. Undoubtedly, indefinite port closure is an exemplary illustration 
of extremity. Considering global trading, that indefinite port closure due to 
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a pandemic goes beyond any level of reasonable risk assumption. When 
parties agree and contract for the sale and delivery of oil or gas, they 
assume the product will reach them. The parties contract under the 
assumption of product delivery. Therefore, that assumption likely 
establishes the third element of frustration, thus giving rise to a 
commendable claim. This example, though extreme, serves to highlight the 
ramifications of a rampant global pandemic.  
Remedy, Looking On, & Conclusion  
Deducing a solution or an avenue of relief centers on the notion of 
reading your contract thoroughly. Looking on, it may become increasingly 
important to include a force majeure provision including pandemic and 
epidemic verbiage. Though these events in real-time are unprecedented, 
they now establish a floor for future contract drafting. The following force 
majeure provision demonstrates the incorporation of pandemic related 
language: 
FORCE MAJEURE. Neither Party will be liable for any failure 
or delay in performing an obligation under this Agreement that is 
due to any of the following causes, to the extent beyond its 
reasonable control: acts of God, accident, riots, war, terrorist act, 
epidemic, pandemic, quarantine, civil commotion, breakdown of 
communication facilities, breakdown of web host, breakdown of 
internet service provider, natural catastrophes, governmental acts 
or omissions, changes in laws or regulations, national strikes, 
fire, explosion, generalized lack of availability of raw materials 
or energy. 
For the avoidance of doubt, Force Majeure shall not include (a) 
financial distress nor the inability of either party to make a profit 
or avoid a financial loss, (b) changes in market prices or 




A provision, like the one above, including language relating to epidemics, 
pandemics, and quarantine restriction better adheres to future events. The 
inclusion of verbiage relating to pandemics and epidemics affords 
contracting parties better protection for unforeseen events in the future. 
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Similar additions arose after the terrorist attack on 9/11 and, depending on 
geographic relevance, after significant natural disasters like hurricane 
Katrina, Rita, and Harvey. In the future, contracting parties may not get to 
debate foreseeability. Given the precedent this pandemic has presented us 
with, the forthcoming of similar events may give rise to less protection. 
Therefore, being more proactive in the future requires an understanding of 
the likelihood of occurrence of events, like COVID-19. As the oil and gas 
industry takes slow steps to return to normalcy, the increasing importance 
of contract language remains. Now more than ever, it is important to 
consider the terms of one’s contractual agreement, as a remedy in the future 
considering the occurrence of drastic events like COVID-19 may become 
sparingly limited.  
Industry Conclusion & Outlook 
In conclusion, 2020 was nothing short of an interesting year. Though 
global oil demand fell by roughly 25% in April 2020, demand has since 
rebounded a considerable amount, though not to pre-pandemic levels.
250
 
Despite the chaos that has ensued upon the oil and gas industry due to 
COVID-19, analysts predict trends of restorative growth in 2021.
251
 The 
final months of 2020 provided the oil and gas industry with a more 
promising outlook than expected.
252
  
Additionally, The United States government commenced remedial action 
to combat the encumbrance of economic hardship. In the wake of the 
pandemic, President Trump signed the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and 
Economic Security (“CARES”) Act into law.
253
 The Act aims to relieve 
domestic industry due to the impact of COVID-19.
254
 Although the Act 
refrains from targeting direct relief to domestic oil and gas companies, it 
indirectly benefits many companies within the energy sector.
255
 This 
indirect benefit is applauded by the department of energy, yet faces harsh 
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opposition from critics and politicians outside of the industry.
256
 The 
criticism spurs from the Act’s tax relief measures.
257
 The Act purports to 
give companies within the energy sector tax breaks due to economic 
hardship and uncertainty generated as a result of the pandemic.
258
 The tax 
relief afforded to the industry includes payroll tax deferral, expanded write-
offs, accelerated refunds, and loss carrybacks.
259
 Payroll tax deferral grants 
employers broader discretion to delay FICA tax payments.
260
 Loss 
carrybacks serve to benefit the oil and gas industry from the economic 
uncertainty provided by the ongoing global pandemic. The CARES act 
gives struggling businesses the opportunity to deduct losses in one year 
from previous years’ profits.
261
 This relief provides for greater liquidity and 




In addition to positive industry forecasts and stimulus-based relief, the 
introduction of the coronavirus vaccine led to an increase in oil futures out 
of optimism.
263
 This signals promise in the efforts of recovery to pre-
pandemic levels of both demand and output.
264
 Though many reputable 
individuals maintain that COVID-19 is here to stay for the foreseeable 
future, the oil and gas industry nevertheless remains adaptive to change. 
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